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I. The Question 
 
What is the relationship between inequality and the prevalence of mobile phones in a society?  It is 
obvious that being poor is a barrier to owning a mobile phone, but what about simply being poorer than 
those around you? Stories abound about the benefits mobile phones bring to the poor in developing 
countries. For example, in Bangladesh’s Narshingdi district, mobile phones have made it possible for 
families who once struggled to survive, to earn more than enough to eat well and live comfortably. These 
isolated villagers who grow crops or raise livestock can use their village cell phone to speak directly to 
wholesalers and are able to get better prices for their goods in the marketplace (Ahmed, 2000). In Cote 
d’Ivoire coffee growers share mobile phones to follow hourly changes in coffee prices in order to sell at the 
most profitable time (Lopez, 2000). But how likely will these poor people be to access a mobile phone if 
they are significantly poorer than the “rich” in their countries. In place where there is such a disparity, does 
unequal income distribution make it less likely that someone will own a cell phone, or does something about 
the condition make adopting this technology even more widespread? 
As it turns out, the results of this study indicate that the higher the level of inequality in a country, 
the more likely someone living there is to own a cell phone. While this result seems counterintuitive, I will 
discuss in detail a few ways to explain it after giving some background on the subject. 
 
Why Inequality and Cell Phones? 
 
Several implications of inequality make its effect on mobile penetration an interesting and important 
question to explore. First, a country can be unequal without being poor. For example, the United States has 
the highest per capita income within the sample for this study, and yet it lies in the bottom 30% in terms of 
equality. Conversely, a poor country does not have to be unequal. Whereas poverty dictates that a person 
doesn’t have a phone simply because he cannot afford one, inequality’s effect concerns more than just the 
affordability of mobiles. 
Secondly, inequality has a tendency to breed more inequality, especially in terms of access to 
technology. So while a country need not be poor to be unequal, by definition the more unequal it becomes, 
the poorer a larger number of its inhabitants will be. There is much anecdotal evidence, like in the stories 
mentioned above, that cell phones can help counteract this effect by helping the poor become less so once  
they are given access. This is probably the most important reason for studying this subject at all; while many 
information technologies seem to be increasing technology related inequality (“Digital Divide”), there may 
be something unique about mobile phones that does the opposite. If we can tap into this difference, we may 
be able to find a measure to counteract inequality and alleviate poverty (see Bayes, 2001 for an example of 
such measures).
Another important reason to explore this relationship is that many studies show that 
telecommunications penetration has a positive effect on economic growth. Defining the relationship 
between mobiles and inequality more clearly may help in developing more effective policies targeted at 
increasing telecoms and thereby increasing economic growth potential. Also, if inequality increases telecom 
penetration telecom providers and policy makers may be able to take advantage of the relationship to help 
counteract inequality’s negative impacts through telecommunications development.  
 
A Couple of Illustrations 
 
There are different scenarios that could possibly describe the effect of inequality on the mobile 
penetration rate. The most intuitive is that as inequality increases, mobile penetration decreases. Imagine a 
country of three people who all have the same amount of income, say $100 each. When cell phones are first 
introduced into the country, all three can afford to have a cell phone, but only the first buys one (he 
happens to be more innovative than the other two and says he’ll use it for internet access). Eventually the 
other two catch on and all three can use their cell phones to talk to each other. But imagine if instead of 
$100 each, two of the three made $80 each and the third made only $40. The mean income is the same, but 
the distribution is much more unequal. Now, when cell phones are introduced, the first two can easily afford 
the initial investment of buying the handset as well as the monthly cost of the service. They call each other 
frequently (after all, they have no one else to talk to) and use their mobiles to get real-time quotes on the 
stock market, make a fortune, and forget about their third friend. Meanwhile, this third person is left out of 
the loop. It takes him much longer to save up for the handset and by then the market is down and he’s lost 
contact with the other two. So he has no one to call and decides not to buy the phone. Penetration has 
therefore dropped from 100% to 67%.  
Now while things aren’t quite as simple in the real world, the above story illustrates one main thing 
about the dynamics of cell phone adoption: the network effect. Given an equal distribution of income, the 
first person to buy the cell phone does so because to him the value of the phone lies in something other 
than its current use for talking to people, since he has no one to talk to. The second and then the third 
person follow suit because the value of the phone goes up with every additional person already on the 
network. In fact, after a certain percentage has bought a phone, the opportunity cost of not having a phone 
goes up; for the marginal adopter it eventually outweighs the cost of buying the phone because otherwise 
the everyone else will use their phones to talk to each other and not to him.  
Because mobile phones are used primarily for talking to other people, the more people there are to 
talk to, the more valuable the network is (Röller and Waverman, 2000). This applies both to those who are 
already on the network and to those still planning to join. An unequal distribution of income could limit the 
size of the network. This will lower its value for those who have yet to join it and possibly discourage them 
from ever doing so. 
On the other hand, you could view the situation from the perspective that high inequality breeds 
demand for luxury goods and thereby increases mobile penetration. Why? Possibly a show-off effect. 
Imagine you live in a country where the divisions in the society are so obvious, that the amount of money 
you make can be determined by the clothes you wear. Now imagine you are poor, so the only clothes you 
have are poor ones. There is no way for you to achieve a high status in the society; wherever you go, you are 
marked as part of the low class.  
Now imagine that you have the opportunity to buy a cell phone. Although you’re still poor, you now 
own a luxury good. And even if you can’t really afford it, nobody can really tell. All they know is that you 
have a phone. So they must assume two things: you have people you need to stay in contact with and you 
must be able to pay for it. Whether either of these is true is somewhat irrelevant. You can now appear richer 
and more well-connected than you actually are1. So without raising your income you’ve found a way to 
boost your social status.   
In places like the U.S., while this phenomenon occurs, it is not as necessary. Although there is a high 
level of inequality, it is much easier to appear as if you have more money than you actually do. You can lease 
and drive an expensive car without being able to afford to buy it; you can buy and wear a $200 skirt for $20 
on clearance. No one is the wiser. It is much harder to distinguish who has money and who doesn’t.  
In lesser developed countries like Egypt and Bangladesh where inequality is more marked, there are 
fewer opportunities such as these to identify yourself with the upper classes. There your social standing can 
often literally be determined by the clothes you wear. Mobile phones are one accessible luxury good that can 
be used to counter this stigma. Therefore, all else being equal, in places with higher, more marked inequality, 
the demand for cell phones, and hence the penetration rate is likely to be higher.  
 
I. Previous Related Studies 
 
Many studies have been done on the dynamics of telecommunications development, but there seems 
to be a gap when dealing with the issue of inequality. Many articles deal with the issue qualitatively by giving 
anecdotal evidence of the benefits mobiles bring to the poor. From stories of Jamaican tradesman on 
bicycles to Indian fisherman to Ugandan taxi drivers (Dholakia and Kshetri, 2001), many authors write of 
lower income groups of people using mobiles to make their small businesses more efficient and more 
profitable. But few attempt to measure quantitatively the impact mobiles are having on poverty or 
inequality. Because of this it is difficult to get a sense whether the anecdotes are isolated incidents or 
whether they are representative of a wide-scale phenomenon. 
Another major concern in the field has been the disparity due to unequal access to information 
technology. As demonstrated in the first illustration above, those who have access to technology can use it 
1 In an article by Natalie Angier (2000) mobiles are presented as goods which mark one’s social position. And while they 
signal a certain amount of wealth, they serve an equally important purpose of indicating social importance. The article goes 
on to illustrate how mobiles are used by men as a courtship display to attract women in a pub; the displays become even more 
intense when the stakes are higher , i.e. the man to women ratio in the pub increases. The same concept can be applied to the 
inequality scenario. In more unequal countries the stakes are higher to appear as if you are wealthier. Mobile phones displays 
will become more intense thereby increasing the likelihood of penetration.
to gain an advantage both informationally and economically, while those who do not fall further and further 
behind. This applies on a national and international level. Rodriguez and Wilson (2000) explore the reasons 
for this divergence and its implications. They construct an index of technological progress and find that 
digital divide is growing, but they provide no quantitative measures of its effects on technology diffusion. 
Other researchers have focused on the role of telecommunications in economic growth. They 
generally find a positive impact (Baliamoune, 2002). Telecommunications supposedly lower transactions 
costs and contribute to increased output. However, Röller and Waverman (2000) find that there must be a 
certain level, “critical mass”, of telecommunications infrastructure corresponding to a 40% mainline 
penetration rate to bring about maximum growth effects. So while developed countries tend to have enough 
infrastructure to bring about higher growth rates, developing countries have not usually achieved the critical 
mass and therefore grow more slowly. This contributes to divergence in economic performance. Based on 
these findings they argue that convergence in telecommunications infrastructure would offset growing 
economic inequality.  
Accepting the importance of the role of telecommunications technologies, several studies have tried 
to isolate the factors involved in their diffusion. One interesting consideration is that the level of political 
and economic freedom can have an impact on diffusion. Rodriguez and Wilson (2000) argue that 
governments that restrict social and political freedoms are likely to restrict access to information and 
communications technologies (ICT’s) because they are powerful tools in circumventing censorship and 
other restrictions. Their results, as well as those of Baliamoune (2002) confirm this hypothesis.  
Gruber and Verboven (1999) have found for a sample of EU countries that the number of 
competing service providers had a significant positive impact on mobile phone diffusion. They also find a 
negative relationship between mobile penetration rates and the size of the fixed-link network indicating that 
landlines are a substitute for mobile phones. They find the same for a sample covering practically all 
countries with mobile phone services (2000). However, for a sample of Central and Eastern European 
countries, Gruber (2001) finds a positive relationship indicating that landlines and cell phones are 
complimentary goods. This could be an indication of the way mobiles spread differently in developed versus 
lesser-developed countries. Using a similar model Gabreab (2002) gives supporting evidence that 
competition as well as digitalization and urbanization have a significant positive effect. Unfortunately, none 
of their regressions examine a measure of inequality as one of the key determinants. So while there is a 
broad range of topics covered, literature dealing explicitly and quantitatively with the effects of inequality on 
mobile phone diffusion has been quite difficult to come by.  
 
II. Approach and Hypothesis  
 
In order to fill this gap I try to determine the effect of the level of inequality within a country on the 
percentage of people who own a mobile phone there. To do this I focus on the statistical relationship 
between the penetration rate in a country and the country’s Gini coefficient, a numerical measure of 
inequality. 
Coming into this study I expected that the network effect described above would be the main factor 
dictating the adoption of mobile phones. Similar studies I found in the literature often used internal effects 
models as a framework for explaining changes in the penetration rate; these models are based around the 
idea that the rate of diffusion depends only on social interaction between those who already have access to a 
technology and those who do not (Botelho & Pinto, 2000; Baliamoune 2002; Mahajan & Peterson, 1985)2.
Based on this intuition I expected there to be a negative relationship between penetration rate and the Gini.  
This would indicate that inequality leads to social separation between the “haves” and the “have-nots”. So in 
countries where there is a high level of income inequality, one might assume that interaction between those 
of different income levels will be more limited than in societies where the income distribution is more equal. 
Because the “haves” in a society are usually the first to gain access to a new technology, limited interaction 
between them and others will lead to limited penetration rates.  
Now while it turns out that my assumptions seem to have been incorrect, the method I used to 
discover that seemed to work well. 
2
 The Gompertz model is a particular form of an internal effects model widely used to estimate the diffusion rate of a 
technology through a social system. It is expressed as dN(t)/dt = bN(t)[lnN- lnN(t)] where dN(t)/dt is the rate of diffusion, 
N(t) is the number of prior adopters and  [lnN-lnN(t)] is the number of potential adopters. b is the index of internal-influence 
–a parameter measuring  the effect of social interaction.
IV. Data Description and Correlations 
 
I use regression analysis along with simple descriptive statistics to get at the relationships between 
the variables. Using data from the World Bank, International Telecommunications Union, Freedom House, 
the United Nations, and various web sources I was able to construct a data set of telecommunications 
indicators, Gini coefficients and country indicators3. The sample covers a cross-section of 28 countries. In 
order to examine trends over time and to maximize the number of observations in the data set, each country 
has an observation for at least five of the nine years from 1990 to 1998. Descriptive statistics for the sample 
are listed below in Table 1. 
Table 1. Summary Statistics for Key Sample Variables 
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum N
Gini Coefficient 35.07 33.03 19.75 63.66 190
Cellular subscribers     
per 100 People 4.0981 0.8408 0.0001 55.1548 190
GDP per Capita       
(PPP) 10,859.20 7,703.00 1,394.00 30,123.00 189
GDP (PPP) 6.57E+11 1.27E+11 9.07E+09 8.18E+12 189
population 9.29E+07 1.47E+07 1.41E+06 1.24E+09 190
Monthly Cellular 
Subscription (USD) 31.07 27.15 5.99 147.71 130
Monthly Cellular 
Subscription as % of 
GDP per Capita 0.0037 0.0026 0.0004 0.0433 129
Main lines per               
100 people 27.33 21.52 0.59 68.91 190
% of Population Living 
in Urban Areas 69 70 19 89 190
These numbers describe the variety of countries included in the study. The sample contains observations 
from countries on all continents except for Africa. Gini measures within the sample range between 19 and 
3
 Indicators such as GDP, urbanization, and population density from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
database (2002). Telecommunications indicators such as number of cellular and fixed-line subscribers come from the 
International Telecommunications Union’s (ITU) World Telecommunications Indicators database (2002). Freedom indicators 
come from Freedom House’s Annual Survey of Freedom. Gini coefficients come from the United Nations’ World Income 
Inequality Database.
64. GDPs range from $9 billion to over $8 trillion and income per capita varies from about $1,400 to 
$30,000 (measured in international dollars).  
 However, these numbers are not practically comparable because they come from a range of different 
years. To get a better sense of what countries lie where within the data set it is more useful to look at the 
statistics across countries in the same year. Table 2 lists all the countries in the sample as well as their 1996 
values for 3 main variables of interest: the Gini coefficient, GDP per capita, and mobile penetration rates. 
Table 2. Sample Countries and Ranks 
Country Gini Coefficient 
GDP 
per Capita 
Mobile 
Subscribers       
per 100 People 
Value Rank* Value Rank Value Rank 
Argentina 45.84 (5) 11,588 (10) 1.65 (15) 
Australia 42.35 (9) 22,346 (3) 21.79 (4) 
Bulgaria 29.31 (20) 5,244 (25) 0.32 (24) 
Belarus 24.22 (27) 5,432 (23) 0.06 (27) 
Brazil 57.20 (1) 6,929 (18) 1.58 (16) 
Chile 54.78 (2) 8,290 (13) 2.22 (12) 
China 28.34 (22) 2,944 (28) 0.55 (22) 
Costa Rica 47.00 (3) 6,761 (19) 1.37 (18) 
Czech Republic 25.37 (24) 13,364 (9) 1.94 (14) 
Estonia 34.33 (13) 6,988 (16) 4.73 (8) 
Finland 27.90 (23) 20,040 (7) 29.27 (1) 
United Kingdom 39.55 (10) 20,534 (6) 12.33 (6) 
Hungary 24.47 (26) 9,803 (11) 4.63 (9) 
Lithuania 34.38 (12) 6,045 (21) 1.37 (17) 
Latvia 32.17 (16) 5,312 (24) 1.14 (19) 
Netherlands 32.00 (17) 22,119 (4) 6.53 (7) 
Norway 32.35 (15) 26,804 (2) 28.71 (2) 
Peru 46.20 (4) 4,484 (26) 0.84 (20) 
Poland 33.12 (14) 7,239 (14) 0.56 (21) 
Romania 30.60 (19) 6,935 (17) 0.08 (26) 
Russian Federation 37.72 (11) 7,090 (15) 0.15 (25) 
Slovak Republic 24.83 (25) 9,336 (12) 0.53 (23) 
Slovenia 24.00 (28) 13,888 (8) 2.07 (13) 
Sweden 29.21 (21) 20,963 (5) 28.18 (3) 
Thailand 45.28 (6) 6,727 (20) 3.17 (10) 
Ukraine 31.40 (18) 3,496 (27) 0.06 (28) 
United States 44.00 (7) 29,266 (1) 16.44 (5) 
Venezuela 43.15 (8) 5,964 (22) 2.56 (11) 
Source: World Bank, ITU, WIID, 1996 values 
* Countries are ranked from most unequal to most equal in income distribution 
Comparing the numbers in Table 2, one sees that Finland has the highest penetration rate at 1,450 mobile 
subscribers per 5,000 people. Finland also has the 7th highest GDP per capita and 6th most equal distribution 
of income. The lowest penetration rate, lying far below both the mean of 312 and the median of 90 mobiles 
per 5,000, is in the Ukraine where only 3 people out of every 5,000 have a mobile phone. The Ukraine has 
the 2nd lowest GDP per capita and the 11th most equal income distribution.  
In terms of income distribution, Brazil is the most unequal (Gini= 57.2) and Slovenia is the most 
equal (Gini= 24.0). Norway and Poland lie around the median of the distribution where the Gini equals 
32.7. Out of the countries with the 5 highest levels of inequality almost all rank within the bottom half of 
the sample in terms of mobile penetration.
GDP per capita ranges from $2,944 in China to over 10 times as much ($29,266) in the United 
States with a median of $7,164. Respectively, these countries are 7th and 22nd in terms of inequality. They 
rank 22nd (28 per 5,000) and 5th (822 per 5,000) respectively in terms of mobile penetration. 
So, how relevant are these 1996 statistics are so many years later? Although these numbers are now 9 
years old, their relevance lies as much in the relative rankings of the countries as in their values; these 
rankings stay more or less similar for all years in the sample period.  More recent figures show that the 
rankings at either end of the distribution remain fairly similar while those in the middle shift more widely. 
For example, as of 2001 Finland ranked second in terms of penetration with 77.8% of its population (3,892 
per 5,000) owning a mobile phone. The Ukraine ranked 26th with 4.4% (221 per 5,000), and the US was 11th 
having 45% of the population (2,250 per 5,000) owning a cell phone.  
The 2001 numbers indicate significant growth across the board in the prevalence of mobiles, but 
they imply very different patterns of diffusion for the different countries. For example, the above statistics 
imply a rise in mobile penetration rate of roughly 9.7, .87, and 5.7 percentage points per year between 1996 
and 2001 in Finland, the Ukraine, and the US respectively. Looking at the data we see that one key 
characteristic is common to all the diffusion patterns and that is that all the mobile penetration rates follow 
an S-shaped pattern over time. However, the exact shape and slope of the “S” differs for each country. The 
values of critical points such as the base, point of inflection, and maximum are determined by various 
parameters; determining if inequality is one of these parameters and the nature of its affect on the 
penetration pattern is the main goal of this paper.  
The general explanation behind the S-shape pattern begins with that a new technology spreads 
slowly at first and then more quickly, then slows down again; Remember that when cell phones are first 
introduced they are generally expensive and only a few people have them. Maybe the only person you know 
who has one is your rich neighbor or that guy at work who always likes to show off. This traces out the tail 
of the S. After a while they get cheaper and enough people around you have bought a cell phone to make it 
a noticeable trend. Before you know it everyday someone else you know has bought one, including you. 
Here is where the rate increases to trace out the body of the S. Soon almost everyone you know has bought 
a mobile and the only ones still holding out are the ones who always complain when people use them in 
restaurants or they go off in a meeting. Eventually they will probably buy one too, but it will take a lot 
longer for them to cave. These people are the ones to whom the head and the neck of the S apply. The rate 
of adoption slows down and levels off as it reaches these people. This is the intuition, next is the data. 
This S-shaped pattern is displayed in the following three charts. In Figure 1 mobile penetration rates 
for the whole sample are plotted versus the year. Observe the initially slow growth of mobile penetration 
over the whole sample and then its take-off beginning around roughly 1993. 
Figure 1. Penetration Rate Vs. Year 
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There are two ways to look at this pattern when comparing diffusion across countries; the first is 
illustrated in Figure 2 which highlights the particular diffusion patterns for Finland, the United States, 
Australia, Hungary, and China within the same sample.  
Figure 2. Penetration Vs. Year by Country 
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Comparing trends, one sees that Finland outpaces the other countries both in the speed and level of mobile 
penetration. Hungary appears to lag far behind while Australia lies somewhere in the middle and seems to 
be very close to reaching its maximum capacity. 
The second way is to look at the pattern produced when the penetration rate is plotted against the 
number of years since the introduction of mobile phones. This is illustrated in Figure 3.  
Figure 3. Penetration Rate Vs. Age of System 
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When viewed from this perspective, Hungary’s rate of diffusion in the first eight years, indicated by the 
slope of its curve, is higher than even Finland’s. And by the tenth year of mobile availability Australia seems 
to be way ahead of the pack in terms of both penetration and diffusion rate. Comparing along this type of 
time trend gives a more accurate picture of the way diffusion differs across countries. 
But many things contribute to this overall pattern; trying to isolate specific relationships is more 
informative. Plotting the penetration rate versus the Gini coefficient helps illustrate the specific relationship 
between these two variables. 
Figure 4a. Penetration Vs. Inequality 
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Although the sample points don’t exhibit an immediately obvious pattern, the trend line indicates that there 
is a slight negative relationship between the two variables. This graph seems to illustrate that as inequality 
increases, the level of mobile penetration decreases. This seems rather intuitive. Figure 4b illustrates shows 
an even more interesting pattern. 
Figure 4b. MobilePenetration Vs. Inequality 
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Dividing the sample in half by inequality causes a slightly different pattern to emerge. It appears that the 
negative relationship holds even more strongly where in equality is high. Noting that the correlation between 
the Gini and income per capita is also negative (see Table 3), this pattern could be an indication of the 
mechanism by which inequality limits mobile penetration. If inequality has a negative impact on per capita 
income, then it is reasonable to assume that where there is higher inequality, people will be less likely to 
spend their limited income on a mobile phone, which is often considered a luxury item. 
As far as affordability goes, it is reasonable to assume that the more expensive it is to own a mobile 
phone, the fewer people will do so. The data confirms this expectation.  
Figure 5. Mobile Penetration Vs. Affordability 
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Figure 5 indicates that mobiles are treated as a normal good, where demand drops as price increases. It also 
indicates that, despite arguments that mobiles are seen as a necessity in some areas where landline 
infrastructure is poor, they are generally still being treated as a luxury good; as the cost rises, not only does 
demand fall off, but it falls of sharply. This pattern lends support to the theory that inequality contributes to 
higher penetration rates because mobiles can be used to show off. Because they are generally considered a 
luxury good, someone who is obviously not well-off can use his cell phone to signal that he has more money 
than he actually does. 
Another interesting relationship is the one between the penetration rate and per capita income. 
There are a few notable differences in the pattern between high and low income countries. While there is a 
positive relationship across the board, penetration in low income countries seems to follow the same S-
shaped pattern with regards to GDP as they do with time. The sample points for China, Finland, and the 
United States are distinguished from the rest to help illustrate the different patterns that exist between low 
and high income countries. If you look closely at Figure 6 you will see other points forming the tails of a few 
partial S’s at the low end of the income scale. In low income countries it seems that diffusion is a much 
more gradual process and penetration does not reach very high rates.  
 
Figure 6. Mobile Penetration Vs. Per Capita Income 
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Penetration rates rise much more linearly with income at higher levels. It also seems that diffusion is an 
easier process in higher income countries; GDP per capita does not have to increase by nearly as much in 
order to see the same rise in penetration. This is likely to be because above a certain income threshold, 
mobiles are affordable and the reasons for not joining the network have to do less with ability to own a cell 
phone than with the desire to. However, in low income countries, a large increase in per capita income still 
may not be enough to make owning a cell phone possible regardless of someone’s desire to have one. 
 The final binary relationship I want to explore is the one between the Gini coefficient and GDP per 
capita.  There seems to be a U-shaped pattern within the data. As per capita income increases in lower 
income countries, inequality seems to decrease. Then as per capita income continues to increase, inequality 
rises again. 
Figure 7. Inequality Vs.  Per Capita Income 
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While the overall relationship seems to be negative, the trendlines highlight the marked difference between 
the relationship for low income and high income countries. Low income countries have a wider range of 
inequality values whereas those with higher income seem to become more widely dispersed as income 
continues to grow. 
 Table 3 summarizes all the above relationships by listing their correlation coefficients. As expected, 
mobile penetration is correlated negatively with the Gini coefficient and affordability and positively with per 
capita income. It’s also interesting to note that the Gini and subscription cost as a percentage of GDP are 
negatively related. So it’s possible that as inequality increases, mobiles become slightly more affordable.
Table 3. Correlation Coefficients of Key Variables 
Mobile 
Penetration 
Rate
Gini 
Coefficient 
Subscription    
as % of GDP   
per Capita
GDP        
per Capita
Mobile Penetration Rate 1.000
Gini Coefficient -0.052 1.000
Monthly Subscription as % 
of GDP per Capita -0.333 -0.087 1.000
GDP per Capita 0.636 -0.059 -0.402 1.000
III. Methodology 
 
So far I’ve just discussed binary relationships, or relationships between pairs of variables. The 
problem with that, however, is that the relationship between any two of these variables is also affected by 
many other factors such as country characteristics, sociological characteristics, or any number of things that 
can’t be accounted for but that are captured in the correlations. In order to examine the relationship 
accurately, these other influences must be controlled for. Regression analysis allows me to isolate the effects 
of one variable on the penetration rate while holding the other factors constant 
The Variables 
The first variable I account for is Gini2, the Gini coefficient. A higher Gini value indicates higher 
inequality. The coefficient on the Gini is the one I am most interested in. As stated above I expect the sign 
to be negative indicating a negative impact on the penetration rate.  
Second is NumComp, the number of competing service providers. Previous studies have shown that 
increased competition is positively related to increased penetration (Barros and Cadima, 2000), so its 
coefficient should be positive and significant. Intuitively this makes sense because competition helps to 
drive down the price of mobile services, making them more affordable for more people, thus contributing 
to increased penetration.  
MAINPEN is the fixed-line penetration rate defined as the number fixed telephone lines per 100 
inhabitants. As mentioned above, the relationship between mobile and fixed penetration rates is somewhat 
ambiguous. Where there are few landlines available or where there is an extended wait time for installation, 
mobiles may be a popular alternative for getting basic telecommunications services. Where landlines are 
prevalent, however, mobiles may be viewed as a luxury item and are therefore adopted by fewer people. In 
either case, the degree of access to fixed telephones is likely to impact the adoption of mobiles and must be 
controlled for. 
SubtoGDP  is the cost of a monthly subscription to cellular service in U.S. Dollars as a percent of per 
capita income. This variable is used as a proxy for the total cost of using a mobile phone. It is an assumption 
in the industry that as handsets get cheaper, the main barrier to adoption will be the per-minute service 
charge (Dekimpe et al., 1998). So ideally this charge would also be a part of the regression, but the data for 
that variable is insufficient. Additionally, Baliamoune (2000) indicates that the tariff alone is a poor indicator 
because it is not comparable across countries. To compare the prices, they must all be converted into U.S. 
dollars or some other uniform currency. However, when this is done, the converted price is no longer 
indicative of the relative cost of the call to the local consumer. Using price as a percentage of per capita 
income should be a more reliable and comparable measure of affordability. This coefficient should be 
negative indicating that higher prices are a barrier to adoption. 
The next variables are country-specific control variables: area, urbanization, a time trend variable, 
and a dummy variable for whether or not the country is considered free. 
Area is the area of the country in square kilometers. This variable is a proxy for the extent to which 
the cellular network must spread in order to achieve 100% penetration. The network would have to go 
much further in a country of 3,000,000 km sq. than in one of 300,000 km sq. Area accounts for the relative 
difficulty in achieving the level of infrastructure necessary to cover the entire country. For example, a larger 
country will require more towers in order to provide comprehensive coverage and uninterrupted service. 
Where these towers do not exist, service is not available and penetration will be limited. For example, it will 
be much easier for a country like Luxembourg to achieve ubiquitous coverage than it would be for the U.S. 
where a greater investment in equipment is required to cover the same percentage of the country’s area.  
URBPOP is Urbanization and is defined as the percent of total population living in an urban area. 
This variable is included because technologies are likely to spread in areas where there is more interaction 
between people. I expect the coefficient on this variable to be positive. I choose urbanization over the 
alternative variable population density because the important factor is not only the amount of people in an 
area, but also the area’s exposure to technology, something more prevalent in urban areas. 
NumYrs is defined as the number of years mobile phones have been available in the country i at time 
t. Since not all countries adopted mobile phones at the same time, using the years since the beginning of the 
sample period in 1990 would exaggerate the effect of the time trend. Instead, the value is defined as 1 in the 
year mobiles are introduced into the country and increases by 1 for every year thereafter. This is a more 
comparable indicator of how long the technology has been able to spread through each country. YrsSqrd is 
this number squared and is included to improve the fit of the model. 
Freedom is a dummy variable for economic and political freedom. The spread of an information 
technology such as mobiles should be positively correlated with the level of freedom in a country. Ideally 
variables that more explicitly describe the economic and social policy climate of the country would be 
available. A measure of government policies toward censorship, competition, and innovation would be 
among those most helpful. But Rodriguez and Wilson (2002) argue that the extent that governments 
promote civil liberties is likely to be the extent that they promote knowledge sharing and limit their 
interference with the market mechanism. So while explicit variables may not be available, a freedom 
indicator should work as a good proxy.  The indicator is based on the rankings published in Freedom 
House’s annual index measuring the level of political and social freedom around the world. After averaging 
the scores for several components of the survey regarding political rights and civil liberties, a rating of 
overall freedom is assigned to each country. Freedom equals 1 for a Freedom House rating of “Free” and 0 
for a rating of “Partly Free” or “Not Free”. Its coefficient should be positive indicating that freedom has a 
positive impact on penetration. 
Next I include dummy variables to control for region of the world. While ideally I would be able to 
include a dummy for each country within the sample to control for country-specific fixed effects, my sample 
is too small. Instead I chose to include region dummies as a proxy to capture these effects. I chose countries 
in Western Europe to be the base region because there was a greater frequency of them within the sample 
and because they are developed countries with a high propensity for cell phone adoption. Countries in each 
of the 5 following other regions are marked with a dummy: Latin America, Asia, North America, Pacific, 
and Eastern Europe.  
Finally I include dummies for the type of Gini measure that was used. The construction of the Gini 
variable and the dummies is rather complex so I leave the explanation for Appendix B.  
The Model 
 
In order to estimate the regression I use the control variables mentioned above as the explanatory 
variables on the right hand side of the equation and a transformation of the penetration rate as the 
dependant variable on the left.  The transformation consists of taking the natural log of a value called the 
the odds ratio of the penetration rate. This whole expression is called the logit. Instead of using the 
penetration rate itself as the dependant variable, I use the logit which looks like this:  
PenRate
1- PenRateLn( )PenLogit  = 
 (1)  
Using this transformation of the penetration rate I can model the non-linear relationship between the 
dependant and explanatory variables while still being able to use a linear OLS regression on the following 
equation: 
 
This form more closely imitates the effect of the S-shaped diffusion pattern followed by the penetration rate 
than a straight linear equation would. Even though the S-shape described above comes about as a function 
of time within one country, I speculate that it holds for the other variables as well. There is some evidence 
PenLogit    = B1(Gini2it) + B2(NumCompit)) + B3(MAINPENit) + B4(SubtoGDP) + B5(Areai)+ B6(URBPOPit) +
B7(NumYrsit) +B8(YrsSqrd) + D1(Freedomit) + D1(Gini Dummies) + D2(Region  Dummies) +  e (2)
that it holds for GDP per capita as illustrated in Figure 6. Also Gruber and Verboven (1999) indicate that 
taking a cross-section of countries at different stages of development at the same time gives a similar pattern 
as looking at one country over time. More details about the alternative specifications for the regression are 
given in Appendix A. 
 
IV. Discussion of Results 
 
The main finding of this paper is that the mobile penetration rate and inequality are positively 
related. The regression results also indicate a positive relationship between the mobile penetration rate and 
the mainline penetration rate.  Surprisingly, urbanization seems to have a negative effect on penetration 
while freedom and the number of competing providers have the expected positive effect.  
The columns of Table 4 list the regression results in two alternative forms.  The first column lists the 
coefficients produced by the OLS regression. However, since these coefficients represent the change in the 
PenLogit variable for a unit change in the given variables, the effect on the actual penetration rate is not 
immediately obvious. In order to make these coefficients more readily in interpretable, I transform them to 
arrive at the numbers in the second column (see Appendix D for more details). These numbers are an 
approximation of the percent change in the penetration rate for a one percent increase in the given right-
hand-side variable.  
However, a word of caution: the transformed coefficients are only intended to give a rough idea of 
the effect of the given explanatory variables on the penetration rate and are based on a one percent increase 
from the mean of the given explanatory variable. But the penetration rate does not vary linearly with respect 
to the right-hand-side variables; so while these percentages are applicable for changes close to the mean, 
they do not hold as closely for changes taken far from it. So with that in mind, I will go on to discuss my 
findings. To give a better idea of the quantitative effect of the key variables I will refer not only the 
transformed coefficient, but also to the effect of changes in the right-hand-side variable between the 50th 
and 75th percentile. In such cases I use as a reference point the expected penetration rate given the median 
values of the variables instead of the means. 
Table 2. Regression Results and Transformed Coefficients
LogisticPen* Penetration Rate
Gini2 3.859 1.3%
(2.46)
SubtoGDP -49.482 0.2%
(-3.11)
NumComp 0.197 0.5%
(2.58)
MAINPEN 4.465 1.4%
(3.53)
URBPOP -2.255 -1.5%
(-3.05)
NumYrs 0.878 5.5%
(13.56)
Yrsqrd -0.033 -1.7%
(-8.34)
Freedom 0.768 0.6%
(4.17)
Area -1.06E-07 -0.2%
(-2.46)
GIDum -0.623 -0.3%
(-0.86)
NIDum -0.640 -0.2%
(-0.91)
IDum -1.009 -0.2%
(-1.42)
GEDum -0.233 0.0%
(-0.29)
LATIN 1.257 0.2%
(2.22)
AMER -2.880 -0.1%
(-3.03)
ISLAND 0.966 0.0%
(2.11)
ASIA -0.879 -0.1%
(-1.05)
EEU 0.926 0.4%
2.35
Constant -9.747 -9.2%
(-9.81)
R-Squared 0.932
Obs 123.000
Dependant Variable
* t-statistics in parenthesis
Using the coefficients produced by the OLS regression I find that, given the mean value of all the 
explanatory variables, the expected mobile penetration rate is 1.27%. At the median values the expected 
penetration rate is 2.14%. Now, while these numbers may seem surprisingly low, it is necessary to note that 
the mean penetration rate included in the regression is only 5.1%. This number is so low because the sample 
includes observations from the 1990 to 1998 when mobiles were not as prevalent as they are now; in some 
cases, they were not even available certain countries in the sample. Also, taking into account that the 
penetration rate increases slowly near the time of introduction, observations from a country which 
experienced introduction during this time span are all likely to be low. So a mean penetration rate of 5.1% is 
not especially shocking, and while an expected penetration rate of 1.27% or 2.14% may be low, it is not 
unreasonable; therefore I use these numbers as my reference points in explaining the effects of changes in 
the various factors involved in determining the penetration rate. 
The most surprising finding of this paper is that the mobile penetration rate and inequality are 
positively related. The transformed coefficient indicates that a 1% increase in the Gini coefficient from 
mean of 33.9 to 34.2, while holding all the other variables constant, will lead to a 1.3% increase in the 
expected penetration rate from 1.27% to 1.3%. Likewise a jump from the median Gini of 32.3 to a Gini at 
the 75th percentile (41.9) leads to an increase in the expected penetration rate from 2.14% to 3.07%. This 
corresponds to about a 43% increase in the penetration rate for a 30% increase in the Gini which, as 
expected, is a slightly higher change than 1.3% coefficient indicates. The Gini dummies are all insignificant 
but improve the fit of the model. This indicates that the type of Gini measure used is inconsequential in 
determining the effect of inequality on the penetration rate. 
The positive relationship between inequality and mobile penetration seems counterintuitive, but I 
speculate on several possible explanations: The first is that unequal countries could be late-adopting 
countries. Gruber and Verboven (1999) find that countries who adopt mobiles later experience faster 
growth in the penetration rate. Within my entire sample the year of introduction (introyr) of mobiles ranges 
from 1981 to 1993. Out of the 95 observations with a Gini over the median, 52 had an introyr of 1989 or 
later. So the positive relationship between the Gini and affordability discussed above could be the link 
between the Gini and the penetration rate. It is possible that by the time these more unequal countries 
adopt, prices of mobiles have fallen making them more affordable, which obviously increases penetration. 
The second possible explanation is that the network effect might not hold as strongly as I had 
assumed. Unlike the example of the 3 person country, in the real world there is always someone else to call. 
So whatever social separation inequality causes cannot on its own be enough to make the network worthless 
to a person once he can afford to join. Even if no one around him owns a cell phone, he can still use it to 
call landlines, do business, access the internet or call family long-distance. 
The third possible explanation of the positive relationship is the show-off effect mentioned above. 
In countries where there is a more marked difference between the “haves” and the “have-nots” showing off 
might be more important. The results seem to indicate that this hypothesis might hold. 
 Another finding is that the penetration rate and urbanization are negatively related. So the greater 
the percentage of the population living in urban areas, the lower penetration will be. The coefficients suggest 
that a 1% increase from the mean in urbanization leads to a 1.5% drop in the mobile penetration rate. 
Looking at it another way, raising the percentage of the population living in a urban area from the median to 
the 75th percentile (from 69% to 83%) decreases the expected penetration rate to 1.57%. These numbers 
indicate a coefficient of -1.3% which varies slightly from the transformed coefficient. Given that the value 
for the 75th percentile of urbanization indicates a 20% not 1% increase from the mean, a difference in the 
coefficient is not surprising.  
Again this relationship is a counterintuitive one; intuition says that urban areas are where technology 
is likely to spread first and fastest. But on the other hand, urbanization implies that people have many other 
options for communication. There are pay phones, internet cafés, and libraries for public access to the 
internet. Also people live closer together and transportation is much more available so instead of calling, a 
person might just go see whomever he needs to talk to.  
The third main finding is that  the level of mobile penetration is positively related to the mainline 
penetration rate. Raising the mainline penetration rate from the median to the 75th percentile, from 26 to 50 
mainlines per 100 people, raises the expected mobile penetration rate to 6%. This corresponds to a 
coefficient of about 1.95%. Again, higher but within the range of the 1.5% transformed coefficient.  
One explanation for this positive relationship is that within this sample, over 68% of the 
observations have not reached the critical mass of 40% mainline penetration that was mentioned above. So 
without a solid telecommunications infrastructure even mobile communications might not be able to take 
hold enough to become a substitutable good. The positive relationship is consistent with the findings of 
other studies which indicate that in lesser developed countries mobiles are seen as compliments and not 
substitutes. So within the dynamics of mobile phone adoption, the phenomenon of people choosing 
mobiles because they are unable to get a landline installed must be less widespread than the anecdotal 
evidence suggests. 
Of the region dummies, all but the one for Asia are significant. However, these results should not be 
relied upon too heavily; the signs of the coefficients and their significance varies considerably across 
alternative specifications for the model. This is likely to be because due to my sample size the groups of 
countries included in each region are not necessarily representative. For example, there are only 2 countries 
carrying the ASIA dummy, one carrying the ISLAND dummy, and one the AMER dummy. With that said, 
the regression results indicate that countries in Latin America and Eastern Europe have positive coefficient 
meaning that they have a greater propensity to adopt mobiles than Countries in Western Europe. The U.S. 
and countries in Asia seem to exhibit less of this sort of tendency. Cultural or social factors may be 
responsible for these results, but again, they should not be relied on too heavily. 
All the other variables have the expected signs on their coefficients. Number of competitors has a 
positive and significant coefficient indicating that the more carriers competing leads to lower prices and 
thereby increases penetration. Freedom is positive and significant indicating that social and political freedom 
does have an effect on penetration- probably through regulation policy as well as higher demand for 
communication technology in a freer society. Area is negative and significant and indicates that the larger a 
country is the more difficult it is to cover thereby limiting penetration. The number of years mobiles have 
been available is positive and highly significant; this is no surprise, it takes time for a technology to spread 
through a society.  
 
VI. Questions for Further Study 
 
There are still several factors that contribute to mobile penetration that I could not include in this 
study. Had time permitted I would have liked to include a variable indicating if there is a standard mobile 
technology in use within a country. For example, if the whole country uses GSM technology, then anyone 
using any service provider will have service anywhere in the country. But if there are competing standards, 
leaving a designated area may mean losing service. Having a standard may affect the penetration rate 
because if consumers know they will be able to use their cell phone anywhere in the country, they may be 
more likely to subscribe. 
Likewise digitalization and the availability of pre-paid calling options may also be incentives for 
consumers to adopt a mobile phone. Digitalization gives better quality reception and pre-paid calling plans 
give consumers more control over how much they spend on calls per month. Including these variables 
could improve the fit of the model as well as offer some additional information about the determinants of 
diffusion. 
Another main consideration of this paper is the effect of mobile phones on the poor in developing 
nations. So after running the regression on the whole sample, I would have liked to run it for a restricted 
sample of developing countries. This may help determine if there is a difference in the way mobile phones 
spread in developing countries versus in other areas. Dividing the sample may give different results 
indicating that inequality has different effects in different environments. Unfortunately, my data set was not 
large enough to get representative results for a split sample.  
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
The results of this study reveal that, contrary to intuition, inequality does not limit penetration but 
rather allows for a higher penetration rate. It seems that, either because unequal countries are late-adopting 
countries or because they are places where bragging rights are more important, that inequality provides a 
space for mobiles to take hold that isn’t present in more equally distributed countries.  
Whatever the reason, these results are an indication that mobiles are different from other 
technologies in that they do not succumb to the traditional pattern of digital divide. It is possible that 
instead of increasing inequality, they could help to alleviate it. Since mobile phones have now been available 
in some countries for about 20 years now, it may be a worthwhile project to examine the relationship 
between mobiles and inequality in these countries to see if any long-run patterns emerge. However since 
these countries are likely to be richer, more developed countries, the results might not be especially 
applicable in the developing country context.  
In any case, the above results have exciting implications for policy makers and mobile service 
providers. Implementing policy to facilitate competition and expansion of mobile networks would be a 
practical way to increase penetration and thereby decrease inequality. If mobile service providers and 
investors take advantage of this and choose to target expansions of their services in unequal countries not 
only could they increase their subscribership, but there could be other positive side-effects. As a result of 
increased investment and marketing penetration in these countries is likely to increase and, in the long run, 
they might be able to take advantage of the growth effects that telecommunications bring about. So while 
this may take years, mobiles may play a role in closing the inequality gap.  
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Appendix A. Regression Results and Alternative Specifications 
 
In order to get a better idea of how well the model I used works, I ran a few other specifications in 
order to compare. The results of the 4 different regressions are listed below in Table A1. The results in the 
first column are the same as those in Table 2; they are the results of the original regression.  
Next I ran the same regression using GDP per capita instead of the variable SubtoGDP (cost of a 
monthly subscription as a percentage of GDP per capita). Both variables proxy for ability to afford a mobile 
phone; SubtoGDP captures affordability on a more individual level, GDP per capita indicates the country’s 
ability to afford mobiles in the broader sense of telecommunications infrastructure and technology 
development. So while these are slightly different effects, including both variables in the regression would be 
somewhat redundant and resulted in making the GDP per capita variable insignificant; and because I was 
more interested in including a proxy for the price of mobiles, I chose SubtoGDP over GDP per capita. 
However, the results of the second regression indicate that GDP per capita is a significant positive 
determinant of the penetration rate. Note that while all the other coefficients have the same sign, almost all 
of them are smaller in this specification. This indicates that an important portion of penetration is due to a 
country’s level of wealth.  
The second alternative specification uses the penetration rate as the dependent variable. I run this 
regression in order to get a feel for the direct relationship between the penetration rate and the RHS 
variables. In this specification the most significant variable besides the time trend was the Gini coefficient. 
In fact, all of the other variables were insignificant except for the Asia and Pacific region dummies. So this 
model does not say very much about the determinants of diffusion. It does, however, confirm that the 
relationship between penetration and these variables is non-linear. 
The third and final alternative specification for the regression uses the natural log of the penetration 
rate as the dependant variable and the natural logs of all the non-discrete variables as explanatory variables. 
The variables all have the same signs and significances as their counterparts in the original regression. This 
specification again confirms that the relationship I am exploring is non-linear as well as confirms the 
direction of the relationships between penetration and the RHS variables.  
Table A1. Alternative Regressions
LogisticPen LogisticPen Cellpen LNcellpen
Gini2 3.859 2.505 0.229
(2.46) (2.03) (2.54)
SubtoGDP -49.482 -0.675
(3.11) (-0.74)
NumComp 0.197 0.167 0.001 0.142
(2.58) (5.5) (0.16) (2.89)
MAINPEN 4.465 3.815 -0.026
(3.53) (3.14) (-0.36)
URBPOP -2.255 -1.406 -0.039
(-3.05) (-1.83) (-0.92)
NumYrs 0.878 0.946 -0.010 0.902
(13.56) (15.44) (-2.65) (19.45)
Yrsqrd -0.033 -0.037 0.002 -0.030
(-8.34) (-9.24) (9.44) (-10.27)
Freedom 0.768 0.632 0.001 0.486
(4.17) (3.46) (0.09) (3.48)
Area -1.06E-07 -2.404E-07 -3.399E-09
(-2.46) (-8.57) (-1.37)
GIDum -0.623 -0.714 -0.056 -0.352
(-0.86) (-0.82) (-1.35) (-0.7)
NIDum -0.640 -0.596 -0.056 -0.305
(-0.91) (-0.68) (-1.39) (-0.61)
IDum -1.009 -0.833 -0.063 -0.772
(-1.42) (-0.95) (-1.54) (-1.55)
GEDum -0.233 -1.186 -0.042 -0.063
(-0.29) (-1.3) (-0.91) (-0.11)
LATIN 1.257 2.108 -0.020 1.398
(2.22) (4.15) (-0.63) (4.28)
AMER -2.880 -1.650 -0.044 -1.352
(-3.03) (-2.77) (-0.8) (-2.05)
ISLAND 0.966 1.888 0.082 1.335
(2.11) (4.46) (3.12) (4.84)
ASIA -0.879 0.623 -0.120 -0.973
(-1.05) (0.89) (-2.49) (-1.58)
EEU 0.926 1.584 0.029 0.942
(2.35) (3.75) (1.3) (4.49)
GDPpc100 0.008
(2.7)
LNgini 1.402
(4.13)
LNmainpen 0.403
(2.05)
LNurbpop -0.767
(-2.35)
LNsubtoGDP -0.429
(-4.57)
LNarea -0.311
(-8.72)
Constant -9.747 -11.310 0.012 -6.469
(-9.81) (-10.53) (0.2) (-3.74)
R-Squared 0.932 0.916 0.854 0.964
Obs 123 183 123 123
Dependant Variable*
* t-statistics in parenthasis
Appendix B. Construction of Gini Variable and Dummies
Ginis for this study were obtained through the United Nations’ World Income Inequality Database 
(WIID). The database is not a set of Ginis calculated by the UN, but rather it is a pool of all those calculated 
for various countries and years by separate organizations and governments. One of the main obstacles 
stemmed from the fact that the Gini statistic can be calculated based on several measures including income, 
expenditure, or earnings. It is arrived at by first plotting the percentage of income (expenditure, earnings) 
received by each percentile of the population. 
 
For example if the richest 50 percent of the population received only 50 percent of the country’s income 
(expenditure earnings), you would plot the point along the dotted line on the graph above indicating that 
income is distributed evenly among the population. However, if the richest 10 percent of the population 
received 50 percent of the income (expenditure, earnings), you would plot somewhere along a curve that 
looks much like the one above. The ratio of the area between the two curves to the area below the dotted 
line is the Gini coefficient. It represents the disparity between a perfectly equal society where everyone 
receives the same amount of income and the actual distribution. The larger the ratio, the greater the level of 
inequality.  
Since there is no one body conducting all of the surveys used to gather the information for the 
WIID, some use income, some earnings, and still others expenditure to calculate the Gini. Therefore, they 
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are not directly comparable because using different measures results in a 5-10 point disparity in the 
calculated Ginis. For example, Gini coefficients of net incomes can be about 5 points higher than Ginis of 
expenditure (WIID, 2000). Moreover, in the WIID there are often several different Ginis measures for the 
same country-year observation. In order to maximize comparability, where there were multiple Ginis for the 
same country-year, the Gini was chosen for which there were the most country-year observations calculated 
using that particular measure. Observations for which that type of measure was not available took Ginis of 
the type for which the next largest number of observations were available, and so on until every country-
year in the sample took on a unique Gini coefficient. Below is a table listing the breakdown of the types of 
Ginis used. 
Table B1. Gini Types
Gini Type Frequency Percent
Gross Income 99 52.11
Net Income 56 29.47
Income 25 13.16
Gross Earnings 9 4.74
Net Earnings 1 0.53
Total 190 100
Since developing a normalizing formula for the Ginis would be too complicated given the diversity of the 
methods used in arriving at them, dummy variables are included in the regression to proxy as a control for 
the incomparability of the different measures.  
To further complicate matters, the information in the WIID is not gathered for a uniform set of 
years, so different countries do not necessarily have a Gini value for every year included in the database. 
Therefore, though the ITU and World Bank provide the other relevant data for almost 208 countries for at 
least 20 years, there were many fewer countries for which enough Gini statistics could be obtained for the 
sample period. The data set used contains one Gini for every country-year observation, but not every 
country is available for all 9 years of the sample period. However, only countries with Ginis for at least 5 out 
of the 9 years were included in order to ensure that there is enough variation over the time span while still 
maximizing the number of countries in the sample.  
Appendix C.  Summary Statistics
Table C1. Sample Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum Obs
Dependant Variables
LogisticPen -5.117 -4.770 -13.596 0.207 190
Gini_Use 35.066 33.028 19.747 63.660 190
Gini Coefficient 0.351 0.330 0.197 0.637 190
Mobile Penetration 0.041 0.008 0.000 0.552 190
cellsubper100 4.098 0.841 0.000 55.155 190
Monthly Subscription 31.068 27.153 5.987 147.714 130
Subscription Cost to GDP 0.004 0.003 0.000 0.043 129
Number of Competitors 3.091 2 1 22 187
mainper100 27.327 21.519 0.593 68.914 190
Mainline Penetration 0.273 0.215 0.006 0.689 190
urpoptotal 68.628 69.710 18.700 89.260 190
Urbanization 0.686 0.697 0.187 0.893 190
Number of Years Since Intro 5.589 5 0 16 190
Years Squared 46.684 25 0 256 190
Freedom 0.720 1 0 1 186
Population 9.29E+07 1.47E+07 1.41E+06 1.24E+09 190
GDP per Capita 1.09E+04 7.70E+03 1.39E+03 3.01E+04 189
GDP 6.57E+11 1.27E+11 9.07E+09 8.18E+12 189
Area 2.43E+06 3.24E+05 1.03E+03 1.71E+07 190
Gross Income 0.521 1 0 1 190
Net Income 0.295 0 0 1 190
Income 0.132 0 0 1 190
Gross Earnings 0.047 0 0 1 190
Latin America 0.200 0 0 1 190
North America 0.042 0 0 1 190
Pacific Ocean 0.032 0 0 1 190
Asia 0.074 0 0 1 190
Europe 0.653 1 0 1 190
Eastern Europe 0.411 0 0 1 190
Western Europe 0.242 0 0 1 190
Country Characteristics
Gini Type Dummies
Region Dummies
Table C2. Summary Statistics for Sample Included in Regression
Mean Median Min Max
LogisticPen
Gini2 0.339 0.323 0.200 0.572
SubtoGDP 0.004 0.003 0.000 0.043
NumComp 2.553 2.000 1.000 16.000
MAINPEN 0.305 0.260 0.032 0.689
URBPOP 0.689 0.693 0.192 0.893
NumYrs 6.203 6 0 16
Yrsqrd 53.504 36 0 256
Freedom 0.772 1 0 1
area 1.44E+06 2.45E+05 1.03E+03 9.63E+06
cellpen 0.051 0.0173109 0.0000351 0.5515475
GDPpcPPP 11,507.50 8,683.00 2,692.00 28,284.00
GIDum 0.496 0 0 1
NIDum 0.325 0 0 1
IDum 0.154 0 0 1
GEDum 0.016 0 0 1
LATIN 0.171 0 0 1
AMER 0.033 0 0 1
ISLAND 0.041 0 0 1
ASIA 0.065 0 0 1
EEU 0.447 0 0 1
Dependant Variable
Variable
Gini Dummies
Region Dummies
Country Characteristics
Appendix D. Construction of Transformed Coefficients 
The transformed coefficients listed in Table 2 represent the percent change in the mobile 
penetration rate given a one percent increase from the mean in the given Right-hand-side (RHS) variable. 
The main equation for deriving the new coefficients is as follows: 
 
PenRate   
1 - PenRate = e
(ßX)
 (D1) 
This equation comes from exponentiating both sides of equation 2. The following steps were used to 
determine the new coefficients. 
 
1. Calculate the expected mobile penetration rate given the mean value of each RHS variable and the 
coefficients produced by the OLS regression (PenRatemean).  
 
2. Calculate the odds ratio of the expected penetration rate (C )
C = PenRate mean    
1 - PenRate mean (D2) 
 
3. Calculate the expected penetration rate given a 1 percent increase from the mean in the variable of 
interest while holding all other variables constant at their means (Pi). 
Pi = C
C + e^(.01ßi PenRate mean) (D3) 
Where ßi is the original relevant coefficient. This equation is a result of solving the ratio of equation D1 
calculated using the mean of all the variables to D1 using 1.01 times the mean of the variable of interest. 
 
4. Calculate the percent change in the expected penetration rate between Pi and X to arrive at the 
transformed coefficient (Ti ). 
T i= P i -PenRate mean    
P i
* 100%
 (D3) 
 
